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TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK: THEORETICAL 
DIFFICULTIES OF ANALYZING COMPELLED SPEECH 
CLAIMS UNDER A RESTRICTED SPEECH STANDARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years have passed since Justice Frankfurter famously 
announced that it is the "business of a university" to provide 
"an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential 
freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." 1 Although Justice 
Frankfurter's proposal appears to be relatively 
straightforward, defining the contours of these "four essential 
freedoms" when they conflict with the "essential freedoms" of 
other actors becomes overwhelmingly complicated. 
Since Justice Frankfurter's pronouncement, courts at all 
levels have struggled to define exactly where the freedoms of 
the university end and where the freedoms of other actors 
begin. This tension between the freedoms of the university and 
the freedoms of the individual coalesced in the recent Tenth 
Circuit case Axson-Flynn v. Johnson. 2 In Axson-Flynn, an 
acting student asserted her First Amendment right against a 
university's attempt to compel her to recite a script as written, 
even though the script contained words to which she 
fundamentally objected.3 Although the lower court decided this 
case using Supreme Court precedent recognizing a person's 
freedom against compelled speech, the Tenth Circuit rejected 
that approach, asserting that a person's interest in compelled 
speech merited no different analysis than that of restricted 
speech.4 Instead, the Tenth Circuit adopted the standard 
announced in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a 
1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (citation omitted). 
2. 356 F.3d 1277 (2004). 
3. Id. at 1281. 
4. ld. at 1284 n.4. 
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standard that referees the boundary between a student's right 
to free speech and a school's right of academic freedom by 
analyzing whether the student speech "bears the imprimatur of 
the school."5 If the student speech could reasonably be 
perceived to bear the school's sanction, the speech can be 
limited as long as the school's actions "reasonably relate[] to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns."6 
Although the Hazelwood rationale is a sound approach to 
refereeing the boundary between student speech and an 
administrator's need to protect the reputation of the 
institution, adopting the Hazelwood rationale in this particular 
instance is fraught with shortcomings. The Hazelwood 
standard was developed in response to an administrative 
decision to restrict potentially embarrassing student speech in 
a school-financed publication that bore the school's name, 7 
whereas Axson-Flynn involved a professor compelling a student 
to speak as part of a course requirement. 8 By refusing to 
acknowledge the differences between compelled and restricted 
speech, the Tenth Circuit established a dangerous precedent 
that gives the school tremendous deference. Following Axson-
Flynn, although students certainly do not "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,"9 a college student may shed significant 
speech rights at the classroom door. 
This paper will discuss the Axson-Flynn decision and its 
implications for free speech and education. Part II includes the 
factual background and procedural history of the Axson-Flynn 
controversy and a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion. Part 
III analyzes the Tenth Circuit's rationale and offers several 
critiques of the court's use of Hazelwood as its primary 
analysis. Part IV offers a brief conclusion to the arguments 
presented in this paper. 
5. Id. at 1285 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 
(1988)). 
6. Id. 
7. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263 (noting that the school principal was 
concerned that publishing two student articles would be offensive to the student 
paper's readership). 
8. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1280 (noting that Axson-Flynn refused to say 
words she found offensive during "classroom acting exercises"). 
9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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II. AxSON-FLYNN v. JOHNSON 
A. Factual Background 
Prior to fall semester, Christina Axson-Flynn applied to the 
Actor Training Program ("ATP") at the University of Utah. At 
her audition with the program's admissions committee, she 
informed the committee that she would not say certain words 
which she deemed offensive to her religious beliefs. Although 
the committee pressed her on her religious objections, the 
committee ultimately admitted her to the program. 10 
Once Axson-Flynn commenced the program, it did not take 
long before her religious objections and the requirements of the 
ATP conflicted. In fact, her first assignment of the semester 
contained two expletives that she had objected to previously. 11 
Without informing her instructor, she modified the script, 
performed the scene, and received an "A" on the assignment. 12 
Later that semester, Axson-Flynn once again had to don a role 
that contained language to which she objected. 13 As this script 
had substantially more objectionable language, she voiced her 
concern to her professor. 14 Her professor, knowing the earlier 
role had similar language, questioned her as to why this had 
not come up during her previous assignment. 15 She informed 
the professor she had modified the earlier script and that 
apparently nobody had noticed. 16 This enraged the professor 
and he told her that she must perform the script as written or 
receive a "zero" on the assignment. 17 The next day Axson-Flynn 
informed the professor that even though taking a zero on that 
assignment would allow her to receive a course grade no higher 
than a "C," she would not retract from her previous stance and 
refused to recite the script as written. 18 Impressed by her 
character, the professor retreated from his previous stance and 
10. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281. 
11. !d. 
12. !d. 
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allowed her to adjust not only that script, but any others 
throughout the semester to which she objected. 19 
At her semester review, Axson-Flynn was once again 
confronted about her language concerns and was strongly 
urged to modify her stance.20 Deeming her behavior as 
unacceptable, the professors told her to "talk to some other 
Mormon girls who are good Mormons, who don't have a 
problem with this."21 When she refused, the committee told 
her, "You can choose to continue in the program if you modify 
your values. If you don't, you can leave. That's your choice."22 
Seeing this situation as irreconcilable, she withdrew from the 
program.23 
B. The District Court 
Axson-Flynn brought suit against the University of Utah 
and the ATP for violation of her free exercise and free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.24 In analyzing her claims, 
the court found that the case "presents a novel question with 
regard to the regulation of speech in the educational forum: 
does required participation in a University's curriculum 
constitute compelled speech ... ?"25 To decide this question, the 
court stated the following: 
The relevant test to determine whether compelled speech is 
constitutionally impermissible is: 1) whether as a threshold 
matter, the speech is compelled, and 2) if so, whether such 
compulsion "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it 
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control."26 
Although the court found it difficult to precisely define the 
"sphere of intellect and spirit" of the First Amendment, the 






24. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1327-28 (D.Utah 2001), rev"d, 
356 F.3d 1277 (lOth Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs contentions under the free exercise clause 
are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed. 
25. !d. at 1334. 
26. Id. at 1335 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 642 (1943)). 
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action "forces the individual to become 'an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable."'27 
In applying this analysis to the Axson-Flynn controversy, 
the court found that the ATP's course requirements did not 
compel Axson-Flynn to espouse any particular ideology, but 
rather required her to recite lines which she found offensive.28 
Thus, finding that the actions of the ATP failed to rise to the 
level of invasion prohibited by the First Amendment, the court 
dismissed the claim by granting summary judgment for the 
U ni versi ty. 29 
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the lower court's 
compelled speech approach. 30 In an extended footnote, the 
Tenth Circuit claimed that although the First Amendment 
prohibits a government actor from compelling a person to 
speak, that prohibition does not hinge on whether the speech is 
ideological in nature. 31 Instead, the First Amendment prohibits 
"both what to say and what not to say,'m regardless of the 
content of the speech. Thus, although there is certainly a 
difference between compelled speech and restricted speech, the 
distinction is ultimately "irrelevant."33 
Having rejected the reasoning of the lower court, the Tenth 
Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of the varying types of 
speech that can occur in school settings. 34 The court concluded 
that campus speech can be divided into three groups: "student 
speech that 'happens to occur on the school premises"'; 
"government speech," which includes speech by those 
authorized to speak in behalf of the school; and "school-
sponsored speech," which constitutes student speech the school 
"affirmatively. . . promotes."35 As Axson-Flynn's speech 
27. ld. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)). 
28. ld. 
29. Id. at 1336. 
30. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-98 (1988)). 
33. ld. at 1290 n.9. 
34. Id. at 1285. 
35. Id. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923 
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occurred within the classroom and was a course requirement 
adopted and promoted by the school, The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that Axson-Flynn's speech fell within the third 
category of "school-sponsored speecho"36 
According to the Tenth Circuit, school-sponsored speech is 
governed by Hazelwood School District Vo Kuhlmeiero 37 In 
Hazelwood, the Court upheld a school administrator's decision 
to eliminate two pages from a student newspaper because the 
content could potentially embarrass the school and its 
associateso 38 Because the student speech "might reasonably 
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school,"39 the 
student speech could be restricted, provided that such 
restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concernso"40 Thus, student speech that the school actively 
promotes-opposed to speech it merely tolerates-can be quite 
restricted provided the school has a legitimate reason for so 
doingo41 
In applying this standard to the case at hand, the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that "[f]ew activities bear a school's 
'imprimatur' and 'involve pedagogical interests' more 
significantly than speech that occurs within a classroom setting 
as part of a school's curriculumo"42 Under the Hazelwood 
standard, "substantial deference" is given to "educators' stated 
pedagogical concernso"43 Operating under such deference, the 
court found that the school's interest in "teach[ing] students 
how to step outside their own values 0 0 0 by forcing them to 0 0 0 
recite offensive dialogue[,] teach[ing] students to preserve the 
integrity of the author's work[,] and measur[ing] true acting 
skills [by the student's ability to] convincingly 0 0 0 portray an 
offensive part" was reasonably related to the ATP's interest in 
training professional actorso44 Thus, the court held that as long 
as the educational goal or pedagogical concern was not in 
(lOth Ciro 2002))0 
36. ld. 
37. Id. 
38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). 
390 !do at 271. 
40. !d. at 273. 
41. ld. at 270-71, 273. 
42. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (citation omitted). 
43. !d. at 1290 (quoting Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925)0 
44. !d. at 1291-92. 
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actuality a pretext for punishing the student in 
unconstitutional ways, it will not be second guessed. But since 
there was still a genuine issue of material fact in this case as to 
whether ATP's actions were simply a pretext for religious 
discrimination against Axson-Flynn, the court reversed the 
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings on the remaining factual issue.45 
The Tenth Circuit warned that requiring any greater 
scrutiny of pedagogical concerns would "effectively give each 
student veto power over curricular requirements, subjecting 
the curricular decisions of teachers to the whims of what a 
particular student does or does not feel like learning on a given 
day. This we decline to do."46 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
A. Compelled Speech us. Restricted Speech 
Despite the Tenth Circuit's detailed opinion, the application 
of the Hazelwood standard appears to be a marked departure 
from other compelled speech cases. By deciding a compelled 
speech case under the wholesale adoption of a restricted speech 
standard, the court inadvertently limited a student's compelled 
speech protection. 
In Axson-Flynn, the court suggests that the difference 
between compelled and restricted speech is without 
constitutional significance and consequently, the two types of 
speech should be treated identically. To support this notion, the 
Tenth Circuit cites Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of 
North Carolina, Inc. in which the Supreme Court noted that 
"[t]here is certainly some difference between compelled speech 
and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, 
the difference is without constitutional significance, for the 
First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term 
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and 
what not to say."47 Standing alone, this clearly supports the 
Tenth Circuit's notion that compelled and restricted speech 
45. !d. at 1293. 
46. !d. 
4 7. !d. at 1284 n.4 (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-98). 
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should be treated identically. Placed in its original context, 
however, a much different interpretation emerges.48 In Riley, 
the Court was not forever eliminating the analytical difference 
between compelled speech and restricted speech, but rather it 
was responding to North Carolina's assertion that compelled 
speech is entitled to less protection than instances of restricted 
speech.49 In light of this context, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that both areas of speech are protected and that simply because 
a government actor is compelling an individual to speak does 
not entitle the government to any greater deference than if the 
government was instead restricting the individual from 
speaking.50 
On a practical level, the operation of compelled speech is 
quite unique from that of compelled silence. The motivations 
behind restricting the speech of another could be quite varied. 
To name a few: disagreement with the viewpoint,51 the content 
is offensive,52 or the time, place, or manner is inappropriate. 53 
In contrast, the motivations behind compelling someone to 
speak would be quite different. Motivations to compel speech 
could be as mundane as creating the appearance that the 
citizenry upholds a particular viewpoint, 54 to more offensive 
motives such as attempting to actually mandate compliance 
with a particular viewpoint. 55 As noted in the lower court's 
opinion in Axson-Flynn, the Supreme Court has in several 
cases recognized the analytical and motivational difference 
between being compelled to speak and being compelled to 
remain silent.56 Despite the fact that this line of cases has 
48. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-98. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-505 
(1969) (holding that suspending students because they wore black arm-bands). 
52. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 4 78 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that 
a student's vulgar and profane speech at a school assembly could be restricted). 
53. See N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 
757 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a large regional shopping center can restrict free-speech 
demonstrations to an appropriate time, place and manner). 
54. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that a state statute 
requiring individuals to display the motto "Live Free or Die" on vehicle license plates 
violated the First Amendment as an unnecessary compulsion of speech). 
55. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking 
down a school regulation that mandated students to salute the flag and recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance on threat of suspension). 
56. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335 (2001) (referring to 
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never been explicitly overruled, the Tenth Circuit rejects this 
approach and conflates two radically different aspects of free 
speech protection. 57 
B. The Danger of Hazelwood in the Compelled Speech Context 
By rejecting the compelled speech doctrine, the Tenth 
Circuit had to look to the restricted speech cases for guidance.58 
The result was not only awkward, but may prove to completely 
eviscerate compelled speech claims from the Tenth Circuit. 
Perhaps the greatest danger that Hazelwood presents to 
compelled speech claims is its "substantial deference" to the 
administrative decisions of educators. 59 The Tenth Circuit 
asserts that speech within a classroom is entitled to such 
deference because it inherently bears the imprimatur of the 
school and relates to pedagogical concerns.60 Thus, under 
Hazelwood, the only protection to the student is that the 
restriction must reasonably relate to pedagogical concerns.61 To 
be sure, the Tenth Circuit added one qualification to the 
deferential Hazelwood standard that the educator's pedagogical 
concern cannot be a pretext for invidious discrimination.62 But 
given the broad deference of the Hazelwood standard, save 
blatantly arbitrary restrictions, an institution is free to restrict 
student speech within the classroom. 
Extending this analysis to compelled speech cases, however, 
may potentially allow unconstitutional motivations to compel 
student speech to be used as the very pedagogical concerns that 
justify such compulsion. The potential shortcomings of this 
approach are illuminated once we reevaluate the Barnette case 
under the principles announced in Axson-Flynn. 
In Barnette, the West Virginia State Board of Education 
had adopted a resolution that required all students to 
participate "in the salute honoring the Nation represented by 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, and Riley, 487 U.S. 781). 
57. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, at 1284 n.4 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
58. ld. at 1284-85. 
59. Id. at 1290 (citing Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 
925 (lOth Cir. 2002)). 
60. ld. 
61. Id. at 1290-92. 
62. Id. at 1292-93. 
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the Flag" while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.63 Refusal to 
do so should be regarded as "insubordination," punishable by 
expulsion. 64 A family of devout Jehovah's Witnesses brought 
suit against the school board seeking an injunction to restrain 
enforcement of this law-participating in these activities is 
against the tenets of their religion and would require their 
children to either participate or be expelled.65 
Under the doctrine announced in Axson-Flynn, the first 
step would be to evaluate whether the requirement to salute 
the flag and recite the pledge was a curricular requirement-
thus constituting "school-sponsored speech."66 As the Board of 
Education's resolution stated that the salute and recital shall 
become "a regular part of the program" of the schools, the 
requirement would likely be construed as a curricular 
requirement.67 The conclusion that this is "school-sponsored 
speech" is further bolstered by the fact that failure to 
participate resulted in expulsion. 68 The second and final step 
would be to determine whether such compulsion reasonably 
relates to pedagogical concerns.69 In passing the resolution, the 
school board was inspired by a recent amendment to the West 
Virginia education statute which required that students be 
taught history and civics "for the purpose of teaching, fostering 
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of 
Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the 
organization and machinery of the government."70 As the 
standard announced in Axson-Flynn is substantially 
deferential, it is difficult to argue how saluting the flag and 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is not at least reasonably 
related to the pedagogical concern of civic duty. 
Thus, under the Axson-Flynn doctrine the resolution would 
be upheld as a curricular requirement reasonably related to 
pedagogical concerns. In Barnette, however, the Court found 
that these pedagogical concerns-namely the West Virginia 
63. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). 
64. ld. at 629. 
65. Id. at 629·30. 
66. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285. 
67. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626. 
68. Id. at 629. 
69. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287-91. 
70. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625. 
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School Board's definition of civic duty-were the very 
motivations that violated the First Amendment.71 To the Court 
in Barnette, the question was not whether such compulsion was 
a curricular requirement, but whether the curricular 
requirement invaded "the sphere of intellect and spirit" 
proscribed by the First Amendment. 72 Unfortunately, under 
Axson-Flynn's deferential standard, evaluating whether the 
course requirement invades the sphere of intellect and spirit 
proscribed by the First Amendment is impossible. 
C. Barnette and School-Mandated Speech 
Based on principles derived from Barnette and other 
Supreme Court precedent, a more workable standard arises. In 
Axson-Flynn, the Tenth Circuit recognized three types of 
speech that occur on campus: student speech that happens to 
occur on campus, government speech, and school-sponsored 
student speech. 73 Instead of grouping compelled speech claims 
into the latter group, a more workable standard would be to 
recognize a fourth area of campus speech: school-mandated 
speech. 
Unlike "school-sponsored speech" where the student speech 
bears the school's imprimatur and encouragement, school-
mandated speech is actually required by the school through 
curricular or other requirements. Instead of focusing on the 
curricular requirements and whether the restriction reasonably 
relates to pedagogical concerns, the analysis of school-
mandated speech would mirror the analysis employed by the 
lower court in the Axson-Flynn controversy. The court would 
first decide whether the speech is in fact compelled, and if so, 
whether the compulsion "invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit" proscribed by the First Amendment. 74 
The difficulty with this standard, however, is defining what 
exactly is the sphere of intellect and spirit protected by the 
First Amendment. 75 As correctly noted by the Tenth Circuit in 
Axson-Flynn, "the First Amendment's proscription of compelled 
71. !d. at 642. 
72. !d. 
73. 356 F.3d at 1285. 
74. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
75. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335 (D. Utah 2001). 
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speech does not turn on the ideological content of the message 
that the speaker is being forced to carry."76 Thus, in defining 
the "sphere of intellect and spirit" of the First Amendment, 
whether the content of the speech is ideological is entirely 
irrelevant. 77 Instead, the focus of the analysis should be 
whether the government action compels espousal of any 
particular view, belief, or ideology_78 In effect, what offends the 
First Amendment is not the compulsion of any particular type 
of speech, but rather compulsion that requires espousal or 
endorsement of any particular idea. 79 By focusing the analysis 
on whether the compulsion requires espousal of a particular 
idea, the court is able to better distinguish between permissible 
and impermissible instances of compelled speech. The utility of 
this standard was highlighted recently in Forum for Academic 
& Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld. 80 Although this case 
did not involve an instance of school-mandated speech, the 
analytical approach of the court is nonetheless instructive. In 
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, law schools and 
individual faculty members challenged the constitutionality of 
a statute that allowed the Secretary of Defense to deny federal 
funding to law schools that prevented military recruiters from 
recruiting on campus.81 Among other claims, the schools 
asserted that, by effectively requiring the schools to allow 
military recruiters to recruit on campus, the statute was 
compelling the schools to endorse the military's recruiting 
message. 82 In evaluating the compelled speech claims, the 
court found that requiring recruiters to come on campus did 
"not present the scenario of directly requiring a private speaker 
to participate in the dissemination of a particular message."83 
Indeed, the school was still free to disclaim any message of the 
76. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4. 
77. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) 
("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected."). 
78. See Phelan v. Laramie County Cmty. Coli. Bd. of Tr., 235 F.3d 1243, 124 7 
(lOth Cir. 2000) ("The crucial question is whether ... the government is compelling 
others to espouse or suppress certain ideas and beliefs."). 
79. Id. 
80. 291 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003). 
81. Jd.at274-75. 
82. Id. at 309. 
83. Id. 
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military with which it disagreed.84 To the court, proscribed 
compulsion involves "an outright regulation on speech and a 
patent attempt by the government to 'prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein."'85 The military requirements fell short of this sort of 
proscribed prescription. 86 
Applying the school-mandated standard to Axson-Flynn, the 
first question is whether the school requirements compelled 
Axson-Flynn to speak. As recognized by the Tenth Circuit, in 
order to pass the class and fulfill the program requirements, 
she had to recite the play as written. 87 Thus, if she wanted to 
graduate from the ATP, Axson-Flynn had no choice but to say 
the offensive words. 88 By requiring Axson-Flynn to recite 
certain words, the ATP clearly compelled Axson-Flynn to 
speak. 89 The question then becomes whether the school's 
requirements forced Axson-Flynn to espouse or endorse a 
particular idea or belief. In forcing Axson-Flynn to recite the 
play as written, the faculty had no intention of her actually 
endorsing or espousing the viewpoints expressed within the 
script. 90 Intriguingly, the fact that she would never endorse 
such views was precisely why the faculty felt it so important for 
her to recite the play as written.91 The faculty never intended 
Axson-Flynn to espouse any particular viewpoint, but rather 
wanted to see if she could accurately portray a character with 
84. !d. 
85. Id. at 309-10 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 642 (1943)). 
86. For cases that employ a similar test for compelled speech protection, see Gay 
Rights Coal. of Georgetown v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (rejecting as a 
violation of the First Amendment a gay rights group's efforts to require the government 
to force Georgetown to grant them university recognition); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Pub. Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 4 75 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (rejecting as a violation 
of the First Amendment a state law that required a utility company to distribute 
potentially adverse propaganda with billing statements); Miami Herald Pub!'g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting as a violation of the First Amendment a state 
law that required a newspaper to provide space to political candidates it opposes). 
87. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (2004) ("There is no question in 
the instant case, Defendants attempted to compel Axson-Flynn to speak."). 
88. !d. at 1282. 
89. !d. at 1290. 
90. See id. at 1291-92. 
91. !d. at 1291 (noting the ATP's belief that requmng students to portray 
characters with which they disagreed helped measure "true acting skills"). 
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which she morally disagreed.92 Thus, although the program 
requirements compelled Axson-Flynn to speak words she found 
offensive, the school's mandate falls short of the espousal 
proscribed by the First Amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the evident shortcomings of the Tenth Circuit's 
opinion, in finding for the University, the court nonetheless 
decided the case correctly. Notwithstanding, the Tenth 
Circuit's rejection of the compelled speech doctrine in favor of a 
new standard based on Hazelwood stands as a dangerous 
precedent that could potentially limit the effectiveness of 
compelled speech claims in school settings in the future. 
One of the fundamental freedoms afforded to universities is 
the ability to decide what is to be taught. This ability, however, 
is not universal. Although universities should be granted broad 
discretion when making and enforcing curricular requirements, 
the university should be restricted from compelling a student 
to adopt a particular idea, belief, or viewpoint. In evaluating 
these actions, "[t]he crucial question is whether. . . the 
government is compelling others to espouse ... certain ideas 
and beliefs."93 By focusing on this crucial question, courts will 
be able to better determine when school-mandated speech 
exceeds the boundaries of permissible curricular requirements 
and violates the First Amendment's proscription of compelled 
speech. 
Brandon C. Pond* 
92. Id. at 1291-92. 
93. Phelan v. Laramie County Cmty. Coli. Bd. of Tr., 2a5 F.3d 1243, 1247 (lOth 
Cir. 2000). 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 
Provo, Utah, 2010. 
